ALJ Bullock Issues Notice In Certain Foam Footwear (337-TA-567)

Posted On: September 1, 2010   By: Eric Schweibenz

On August 26, 2010, ALJ Charles E. Bullock issued a notice regarding the remand proceeding in Certain Foam Footwear (Inv. No. 337-TA-567).  The notice follows a February 24, 2010 judgment of the Federal Circuit overturning the ITC’s July 25, 2008 final determination of no violation of Section 337 and remanding the investigation.  See our July 9, 2010 and February 24, 2010 posts for more details.

In the August 26 notice, ALJ Bullock noted that the ITC “remanded this Investigation to the undersigned for further ‘proceedings consistent with the February 24, 2010 judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Crocs, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010), including a determination regarding the outstanding issue of enforceability of the ‘858 and ‘789 patents.’”  ALJ Bullock determined in the notice that “the issue of enforceability was tried before the undersigned and fully briefed by the parties in their post-trial submissions…[and thus] the remand proceedings will proceed on the evidence already of record.”

Thomson Licensing Files New 337 Complaint Regarding Certain Liquid Crystal Displays

On August 27, 2010, Thomson Licensing SAS of France and Thomson Licensing LLC of Princeton, New Jersey (collectively “Thomson Licensing”) filed a complaint requesting that the ITC commence an investigation pursuant to Section 337.

The complaint alleges that Chimei Innolux Corporation of Taiwan, Innolux Corporation of Austin, Texas, Chi Mei Optoelectronics USA, Inc. of San Jose, California, and MStar Semiconductor, Inc. of Taiwan (collectively, the “Proposed Respondents”) through the manufacture, sale for importation, importation, and/or sale within the U.S. after importation of certain liquid crystal display devices, including monitors, televisions, and modules, and components thereof infringe certain claims in U.S. Patent Nos. 6,121,941 (the ‘941 patent), 5,978,063 (the ‘063 patent), 5,648,674 (the ‘674 patent), 5,621,556 (the ‘556 patent), and 5,375,006 (the ‘006 patent) (collectively, “asserted patents”).

More specifically, Thomson Licensing describes the accused products as liquid crystal display (LCD) devices manufactured and imported from China, including monitors, televisions, and modules and components thereof, including LCD panels, LCD controllers, and birefringent film.

The complaint describes the ‘941 patent as relating to devices and methods that utilize the total time – that is, the time associated with the active regions and inactive periods – in CRT video image signals to create images that can be displayed on an LCD with more lines using a lower clock frequency than could have been used to generate the same display on a CRT, wherein the active regions of an input video image signal are sampled and written into a buffer memory at a first rate, and they are read out of the memory at a second rate and processed and displayed on the LCD using the same total time available from the CRT video image.  The ‘063 patent is described as disclosing and claiming LCD panel spacer elements that are positioned and shaped or formed in non-active areas of an active matrix LCD in order to minimize picture distortion while maintaining a uniform distance between the substrates, wherein the spacing elements also allow for an alignment layer to be placed over them and be effectively mechanically rubbed, which enhances display quality.  The complaint describes the ‘674 patent as directed to an improved structure for the pixel electrode, and its associated capacitor of an active matrix LCD thin film transistor (TFT), wherein the area occupied by the pixel electrode and the added capacitor is maximized, and it can be more efficiently fabricated by forming the data line, portions of the TFT, and the top electrode of the added capacitor from the same layer of a highly conductive metal.  The complaint further describes the structure taught and claimed by the ‘674 patent to include a pixel electrode made from indium tin oxide that is electrically connected to the TFT through the top electrode of the added capacitor.  The ‘556 patent is described as directed to an active matrix LCD made by forming bottom-gate type TFTs and pixel electrodes over a passivation layer, wherein the passivation layer and gate insulating layer have specific relative etch rates to allow for the creation of a via through both layers resulting in simpler processing and better panel performance.  The complaint describes the ‘006 patent as teaching and claiming a structure that diminishes light leakage by including a material extending in a plane parallel to and between the first and second polarizers, which material has a uniaxial negative birefringence along an axis inclined with respect to the normal to the plane in which the material extends.

The complaint alleges that Thomson Licensing conducts significant domestic industry activities in the United States relating to the asserted patents, including Thomson Licensing LLC’s substantial investment in the exploitation of the patents-at-issue through an extensive program of licensing those patents to over 180 companies.  The complaint further asserts that Thomson Licensing LLC has invested substantial resources, labor, and capital in order to exploit the patents-at-issue in the United States through such licenses, and that Thomson Licensing LLC conducts its extensive licensing activities in the United States primarily from its facility in Princeton, New Jersey.

With respect to related litigation the complaint states that on July 23, 2010, Thomson Licensing filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware against the Proposed Respondents for infringement of the Asserted Patents.   The complaint also states that on April 20, 2010, April 22, 2010, and June 14, 2010, ex parte requests for reexamination were filed against the ‘674 patent, the ‘556 patent, and the ‘006 patent, respectively.

Regarding potential remedy, Thomson Licensing seeks a limited exclusion order pursuant to Section 337(d), and a permanent cease-and-desist order pursuant to Section 337(f) directed to Chimei Innolux and their affiliates and subsidiaries.

American GNC Files New 337 Complaint Regarding Certain Marine Autopilots with GPS or IMU

On August 26, 2010, American GNC of Simi Valley, California (“AGNC”) filed a complaint requesting that the ITC commence an investigation pursuant to Section 337.

The complaint alleges that Furuno Electronics Co., Ltd. of Japan, Furuno U.S.A. Inc. of Camas, Washington, Navico Holding AS of Norway, Navico UK, Ltd. of the United Kingdom, Navico, Inc. of Nashua, New Hampshire, Flir Systems, Inc. of Wilsonville, Oregon, Raymarine UK Ltd. of the United Kingdom, and Raymarine Inc. of Merrimack, New Hampshire (collectively, the “Proposed Respondents”) through the manufacture, sale for importation, importation, and/or sale within the U.S. after importation of marine autopilots with GPS or IMU and components thereof infringe certain claims in U.S. Patent No. 6,596,976 (the ‘976 patent).

The complaint describes the ‘976 patent as relating to a method and system for pointing and stabilizing a device which needs to be pointed and stabilized with a determined orientation, for example, an antennae, missile, or rifle, wherein output signals of an inertial measurement unit and the desired direction information are processed to compute rotation commands to an actuator; the actuator rotates and stabilizes the device at the desired direction according to the rotation commands.  The complaint further states that the method and system also provide a visual and voice device attached to provide a user with visualization and voice indications of targets and the pointing and stabilization operational procedure.  The complaint asserts that this system has been adopted by the Proposed Respondents for use in various marine autopilot devices with a GPS or IMU, making it possible, for example, to maintain a set course that is not affected by wind and tide.

With respect to the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement, AGNC asserts that several of its products, including those it manufactures for the United States Navy are covered in whole or in part by the ‘976 patent, and that all of its work for such products, including research and development, consultation, manufacturing, product sales, sales support, licensing and operations occurs in its Simi Valley, California location.  With respect to the economic prong, the complaint alleges AGNC’s domestic industry activities include significant investment in plant and equipment, significant employment of labor and capital and substantial investment in engineering and R&D with respect to its products practicing the ‘976 patent.

Regarding potential remedy, AGNC seeks a permanent exclusion order pursuant to Section 337(d), or in the alternative, a permanent limited exclusion order, and a permanent cease-and-desist order pursuant to Section 337(f) directed to each of the Proposed Respondents.

ALJ Bullock Denies Motions for Summary Determination in Certain Mobile Communications and Computer Devices (337-TA-704)

Posted On: August 30, 2010   By: Eric Schweibenz

On August 26, 2010, ALJ Charles E. Bullock issued Order No. 31, Order No. 34, and Order No. 35 in Certain Mobile Communications and Computer Devices and Components Thereof (Inv. No. 337-TA-704).

In Order Nos. 31 and 34, ALJ Bullock denied Respondents Nokia Corporation and Nokia, Inc.’s (collectively, “Nokia”) motions for summary determination of invalidity and for Complainant Apple Inc.’s (“Apple”) alleged failure to satisfy the domestic industry requirement.  Similarly, in Order No. 35, ALJ Bullock denied Apple’s summary determination motion that Nokia is not licensed to practice three of the disputed patents.  In denying the three motions, ALJ Bullock determined that genuine issues of material fact remained and thus summary determination was inappropriate.

ALJ Bullock Grants Motion To Terminate Investigation In Certain Game Controllers (337-TA-715)

Posted On: August 30, 2010   By: Eric Schweibenz

On August 24, 2010, ALJ Charles E. Bullock issued Order No. 6 in Certain Game Controllers (Inv. No. 337-TA-715).

In the Order, ALJ Bullock granted a joint motion filed by Complainant Microsoft Corporation and Respondents Datel Design and Development, Ltd. and Datel Design and Development, Inc. to terminate the investigation based on a settlement agreement.

Q & A With T. Spence Chubb of WilmerHale

Posted On: August 27, 2010   By: ITC 337 Law Blog
Topics: Q&A with...

T. Spence Chubb is a Special Counsel with the law firm of WilmerHale in Washington, D.C.  Spence joined the firm in 2010 after leaving his long-time post at the U.S. International Trade Commission.  From 1989 to 2010, Spence served as a Supervisory Attorney in the Office of Unfair Import Investigations (“OUII”) at the ITC, where he handled litigation involving  patent, trademark, trade secret, and unfair competition claims under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and supervised Commission investigative attorneys.  Spence served as a Commission Investigative Attorney from 1986 to 1989.  During his time with the ITC, Spence participated in more than 85 trials and 186 cases.

Spence spoke recently to ITC 337 Law Blog.

What are some of the most significant changes to Section 337 practice since you started as an ITC attorney in the 1980s?

Your question is a challenge because so many changes have taken place that it is almost easier to think about what’s still the same.  Certainly some of the biggest changes from when I first appeared before the Commission while I was in private practice in 1984 and then started working at the Commission in 1986 stem from the elimination of the injury requirement for statutory intellectual property cases. (As everyone familiar with Section 337 practice knows, “statutory IP cases” means for the most part patent infringement cases.)  What occurred subsequently was a sea change in the number and mix of cases being brought under Section 337.  Ironically, despite the fact that the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act changes of 1988 were primarily meant to make Section 337 an easier forum for the use of companies with patent-based complaints while keeping the statute basically the same for complainants with non-statutory-based complaints, the level of utilization of the statute by patent-based  complainants remained basically unchanged while the number of non-patent-based cases dropped off significantly.  Overall, this reduced the numbers of new complaints being brought every year from the 30s and 40s prior to the 1988 Act to the low to mid-teens for most years for the rest of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s.  On the other hand, the caseload became more and more dominated by high tech, high stakes technologies.  For example, I recall that around the time I started at the ITC, cases involving semiconductor chips would trickle in at about one a year.  Before too long integrated circuit cases had become one of the most popular, if not the most popular, types of cases that were being brought.

In addition to the increasingly sophisticated technology at issue in the cases and their increasing stakes, Section 337 litigation like all complex litigation was undergoing the transition to the world of email and the internet, electronic discovery, the use of cell phones and remote computer access, and the use of more expensive and intricate graphics in trials.

So, basically, Section 337 practice has evolved from an area that tended to be concentrated on low-tech, inexpensive imports to a practice that focuses on sophisticated and complex technologies and cutting edge legal issues.

What is the purpose of the Office of Unfair Import Investigations (OUII)?

The Trade Act of 1974 made many fundamental changes to Section 337 and to the U.S. International Trade Commission in general (including changing the name from the U.S. Tariff Commission).  Perhaps the most significant was requiring that Section 337 cases be conducted as full due process, adversarial proceedings under the formal adjudication provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.  As I understand it, in making the necessary rule changes to adjust to the new procedures, the Commission determined that assigning an attorney in its employ to represent the public interest would help to insure that public interest issues would not get lost sight of in the conduct of these newly adversarial inter partes proceedings.  The original group of these public interest attorneys was a part of the ITC General Counsel’s office, but it was soon realized that such an arrangement was unworkable if the public interest attorney was to be a full party to the case with the same restrictions on ex parte contacts with decisionmakers (i.e., the Administrative Law Judges and the Commission and their legal advisors) as the private parties.  Accordingly, the division that became OUII was spun off as a separate office under the ITC’s Director of Operations rather than under the General Counsel.

It is the practice of OUII to designate one (or occasionally two) of its attorneys to represent the public interest in every single Section 337 investigation.  (OUII also has the power to file a Section 337 complaint on behalf of the public interest, but that power has only been utilized once for a regular Section 337 investigation, and only a few times for “enforcement proceedings” related to outstanding remedial orders.)  The OUII attorney is a full party to the investigation with the same abilities as the attorneys for the private litigants (although almost invariably with far fewer resources!).  This means that the “investigative attorney” (or IA) will conduct written discovery, seek the production of documents, participate in depositions, and engage in motions practice.  Ultimately, the IA will take positions on the merits of all the technical and legal issues and argue those positions in his or her pre-trial brief and at trial before the Administrative Law Judge.  Following the Judge’s decision on the merits, OUII will continue to participate as an independent party in the review proceedings before the Commission, again arguing the positions it has taken previously.

It should be kept in mind that OUII makes a decision on how to argue the merits based upon how it views the evidence and the law, not based upon any political considerations or any protectionist or pro-patent leanings.  In reality, because OUII takes a position on all of the issues on an issue by issue basis (down to the level of the individual elements of a patent claim), OUII’s positions are usually not entirely on the side of one of the private parties or the other, but are instead a “mixed bag.”

Prospective complainants can meet with OUII before filing a Section 337 complaint.  In practice, how does that work, and what are the benefits in doing so?

I can speak to this question as a former OUII supervisory attorney, and less so from my new perspective as a private practitioner.  Attorneys for the prospective complainant will contact OUII a few weeks in advance of completing their draft complaint to let the OUII supervisory staff know that there is a potential new case in the works.  When a draft is ready for review, a meeting or conference call can be set up with OUII.  These days, with the very high caseload level, OUII generally prefers to set the meeting with counsel for prospective complainants to take place a full week to ten days after delivery of a copy of the final draft complaint.  OUII rarely meets with counsel for the prospective complainant without first receiving the draft complaint, with the exceptions usually relating to potential cases that have unique jurisdictional or other fundamental first-impression issues that both the private attorneys and OUII feel should be discussed even before work on a draft is begun.

In a typical situation, OUII will have one or two supervisory level or senior staff attorneys review the draft complaint and meet with the prospective complainant’s attorneys (who sometimes are accompanied by an in-house company representative).  Because Section 337 complaints require so much more detail than complaints in the U.S. District Courts, the main purpose and advantage of the review is for OUII to point out areas where the complaint needs more detail.  Unless the complaint’s allegations are obviously and facially insufficient, it is not OUII’s function in these reviews to comment on or take any position on the merits.  OUII’s attorneys do not form any sort of “bond” or “allegiance” with the complainant – they provide procedural information as they would to any member of the public seeking such information.  More often than not, the OUII attorneys reviewing the draft complaint will not be the same OUII attorneys ultimately assigned to the investigation once it is instituted by the Commission.

It appears that Markman hearings are becoming more prevalent in Section 337 investigations.  Do you think this trend will continue, and, if so, how will it affect Section 337 practice?

I think the jury is still out on the value and practicality of “Markman” (i.e., claim construction) hearings in Section 337 proceedings.  Many in the 337 bar, including some Commission attorneys, see them as a way of promoting earlier settlement, since a party that receives an unfavorable claim construction ruling early in a case may be likely to perceive settlement as a more attractive prospect than going forward through the expensive trial and the review process with a bad construction on the outside hope of having that construction reversed by the Commission (and then having to go through another expensive trial and review process).  In my view, it will likely take years for us to realistically assess whether an early Markman process will significantly impact settlement rates in Section 337 investigations.  Proponents of Markman hearings also point to a reduction in the expense and complexity of trial because it eliminates the need for putting on a case addressing two or more alternative claim constructions.

For now, I suspect that the different ITC Judges will continue each with their own versions of the claim construction process.  In other words, some will continue to hold early claim construction hearings (or at least receive written briefs on the subject) and make rulings early enough to impact not just the conduct of the trial but the summary determination phase; and others will take input on the parties’ claim constructions issues before trial so that they are aware of the key elements in dispute but will not decide them until submitting their “final initial determination” on the merits.  This year, Chief Judge Paul Luckern held his first early Markman hearing and issued a ruling, but has often expressed reservations about how the process will work in view of the need for Commission review in time for meaningful consideration of the Commission’s final claim constructions for summary determination motions and trial purposes.  In the case in question, the Commission has sought input from the parties on whether the Judge was correct to issue his claim construction ruling as an “initial determination” (ID) rather than as an ordinary order.  An ID requires the Commission to consider whether to review right away rather than being able to wait until later in the case as happens with orders.  No doubt the Commission’s decision on that issue will impact the future of claim construction procedures at the Commission.  I should point out that Chief Judge Luckern does have at least one more Markman hearing scheduled in a more recently instituted case.

How long do ITC trials typically last?  Also, how long is a typical trial day?

I have experienced trials that have lasted from one day to more than four weeks, and am aware of some having gone longer.  However, the more common length of trial is one to two weeks.  Most Judges start around 9:00 each morning, and end somewhere between 4:30 and 6:00 p.m.  Some are willing to start earlier and go later if more trial time seems necessary, and some are willing to add a day or more to the length of the trial if needed.

To what do you attribute the steady increase in Section 337 filings at the ITC?

There are many causes that attorneys in the 337 bar will point to.  I think that the remarkable surge in Section 337 complaints is a combination of factors, with perhaps the biggest truly being a “snowball” effect.  In other words, knowledge of Section 337 as an attractive alternative to district court litigation grew gradually, but at some point reached a critical mass where the message began to spread even more rapidly, so that attorneys that had barely heard about the statute in the past and about the Commission’s ability to handle sophisticated IP cases in an expeditious manner were getting exposed and Section 337 was becoming a serious alternative, both for them and their clients.  The rise of the district court rocket dockets helped emphasize and popularize the notion of obtaining a speedy resolution to IP disputes, which also helped push the ITC into consideration since the Commission had always been known for its speed.  And, of course, there was the Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay decision dealing with the availability (or lack thereof) of district court injunctions in patent cases.  Interestingly,  it does not appear that the Federal Circuit’s 2008 Kyocera decision, making it more difficult to obtain “downstream” relief at the Commission, has had any dampening effect on the filing of cases before the Commission.

What is a Section 337 Enforcement Proceeding?

The Commission has two basic types of remedies – (1) exclusion orders that are enforced by Customs at the border and (2) cease and desist orders that are like injunctions in that an action to enforce a C&D order must be brought at the issuing tribunal, in this case the Commission.  However, either type of order can serve as the basis for an ITC enforcement action.  There are also two types of enforcement proceeding, formal and informal.  I will limit my answer to the formal type, since the informal-type proceedings are very rare.

Generally, enforcement complaints are filed by the party that was the original complainant in the underlying investigation in which the remedial orders issued.  Enforcement proceedings can be self-initiated by the Commission through a complaint filed by OUII, but this is very rare.  The enforcement complaint will allege that the enforcement respondents have violated the Commission’s orders by importing and/or selling products, or engaging in some other related behavior, in violation of the orders.  Not surprisingly, the most common acts alleged in enforcement complaints under Section 337 are continued patent infringements.

If the Commission finds the enforcement complaint to be sufficient, it will institute a formal enforcement proceeding that is usually delegated to an Administrative Law Judge for an “enforcement initial determination” (EID).  An OUII staff attorney will be assigned as an independent party to represent the public interest and the Judge will set a target date as in a typical 337 investigation.  The enforcement respondents are given an opportunity to answer the complaint, and typically the case will proceed through discovery and trial much like a regular 337 investigation, followed by the Judge issuing an EID.  The Commission will then decide whether to review the EID or let it stand.

If a violation of an exclusion order is found, the Commission has the authority to modify or clarify the order if appropriate, and if the enforcement respondent is not already subject to a C&D order, the Commission can impose one.  If a violation of a C&D order is found, the Commission can impose civil penalties of up to $100,000 per violation day or twice the total domestic value of the infringing goods that were imported and/or sold on each such day by each enforcement respondent.  In addition, if an enforcement respondent’s goods are not already subject to an exclusion order, the Commission can issue one to insure that from that point on there will be border enforcement by Customs.  If a civil penalty is assessed, the government can collect it in a civil action in an appropriate U.S. district court.

What are some of the ways that ITC complaints differ from district court complaints?

The Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure are in many ways patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but are quite different when it comes to what is required in terms of the complaint.  Largely because Section 337 investigations result in considerable involvement by the Commission, a government agency, and can have wide-ranging public interest implications, the Commission through its complaint rule, 19 C.F.R. § 210.12, requires substantially more detail than a district court complaint.  In other words, Section 337 complaints are not notice pleading but fact pleading.

In this regard, some of the additional information required from the complainant by the Commission before it will institute an investigation includes (and this is not an exhaustive list):  Tariff Schedule numbers for the accused imported goods; information on related litigation; details regarding the “domestic industry” that the complainant seeks to protect; evidence of patent ownership, including certified copies of any assignments (i.e., certified by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); certified copies of the patents themselves and of their prosecution history files; if injury is alleged (as it must be in non-statutory-IP cases), details regarding the injury including information on matters such as complainant’s profits and losses, pricing information, and the level of respondents’ sales of the accused products; licensee information; information on foreign counterpart patents; and detailed claim charts setting forth complainant’s allegations regarding not only respondents’ infringement of all of the asserted independent claims, but also demonstrating the domestic industry’s utilization of the asserted patents.

Confidential treatment can be obtained for the complaint and many of the supporting exhibits, but for most such documents the Commission will expect the complainant to supply redacted “public versions.”

If there is one thing that you want our readers to know about the ITC and/or Section 337 practice, what is it?

Having spent over 23 years with the Office of Unfair Import Investigations and now just beginning with my new firm, WilmerHale, I think it is still most appropriate for me to emphasize the value that OUII brings to the quality and effectiveness of the Section 337 process and to highly recommend that private attorneys appearing in Section 337 investigations appreciate that value and try to take advantage of OUII as a resource and, if possible, an ally in the fray.  Because OUII is an independent and impartial party, it necessarily maintains a certain distance from the private parties in terms of litigation strategy and tactics.  However, OUII does have a public interest in facilitating the process by providing however much information it is practical and appropriate to provide to the “public,” the “public” in this case including the actual litigants appearing in an investigation.  It should be kept in mind that OUII attorneys are experienced in all aspects of Section 337 proceedings (and for information that they don’t know off the top of their heads, they know where to look), as well as in complex patent and other IP litigation, so they can be a resource; again, to the extent practical and appropriate.

In terms of briefing and argument in motions practice and in connection with trial on the merits, it is important to keep in mind that while the Judges do not always agree with OUII’s positions, they are always very interested in hearing what OUII has to say and always take OUII’s positions into serious consideration.  This is especially the case for matters that are unique to Section 337 practice at the ITC and for matters of Commission policy, but it is also true for matters such as patent infringement and validity.  Thus, being able to convince the assigned OUII staff attorney of the reasonableness of the client’s positions on the issues is generally perceived as an advantage and worthy of some additional effort.

Federal Circuit Reverses-in-Part and Remands in General Protecht Appeal (2009-1378, -1387, -1434)

On August 27, 2010, the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in General Protecht Group, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 2009-1378, -1387, -1434.  This is one of two opinions relating to appeals from the ITC’s March 9, 2009, final determination in Certain Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters and Products Containing Same (Inv. No. 337-TA-615).   The Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s determination in all respects except for reversing and remanding infringement determinations regarding two of the three patents that the ITC found infringed.

By way of background, Pass & Seymour (“P&S”) initiated the investigation against a number of respondents in connection with the importation and sales of products containing Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters (GFCI) that allegedly infringed U.S. Patent Nos. 7,212,386, 5,594,398 (the ‘398 patent), 7,283,340 (the ‘340 patent), and 7,165,564.  Only three of the original respondents are involved in the appeals:  General Protecht Group, Inc. (“GPG”), Shanghai ELE Manufacturing Corporation (“ELE”), and Wenzhou Trimone Science & Technology Electric Co. Ltd. (“Trimone”) (collectively, the “Appellants”).  The ITC found that GFCI devices manufactured by Appellants infringe one or more claims in the ‘398 patent, the ‘564 patent, and the ‘340 patent, and that none of these patents is invalid or unenforceable.  See our June 4, 2010 post for more details.

‘340 Patent

The ITC found that the GFCI devices from each Appellant infringed the ’340 patent.  Specifically, GPG’s 2003 and 2006 GFCIs infringed claims 14 and 18; Trimone’s 2006 GFCIs infringed claims 14 and 18; and ELE’s 2006 GFCIs infringed claims 14, 18, and 30.

The opinion describes the ’340 patent as directed to a GFCI receptacle that detects the wiring state of the device and inhibits operation if the device is miswired.  To effect the miswiring protection, the ’340 patent requires a “detection circuit” to detect whether the GFCI device is properly wired to an electrical circuit, and “four sets of interrupting contacts” configured to make or break an electrical circuit between the line terminals and the load terminals.

The Appellants and the ITC did not challenge the ALJ’s interpretation of “detection circuit,” as meaning “at least one detection circuit having a circuit segment connected between the line terminals and configured to generate a predetermined signal in response to detecting a proper wiring condition, which occurs when the line terminals are connected to a source of AC power.”  The Federal Circuit held that the ITC erred because the construed claims require the “detection circuit” to “generate a predetermined signal in response to detecting a proper wiring condition,” while the “predetermined signal” relied upon by the ITC was merely the “current flow” originating from the hot line terminal.  In other words, the identified circuit does not generate this current; it is the current that comes from the AC power connection.  So according to the opinion, instead of detecting a proper wiring condition and generating a signal in response, as the properly construed claim requires, the accused GFCIs simply have power to operate, or not.  For this reason, the Federal Circuit reversed the ITC’s determination that ELE’s 2006 GFCIs infringe claims 14, 18, and 30 of the ’340 patent and GPG’s 2003 and 2006 GFCIs infringe claims 14 and 18 of the ’340 patent.

The Federal Circuit further held that the ITC erred by counting receptacle outlets as two of the “four sets of interrupting contacts” required by the ‘340 patent.  The issue turned on whether receptacle outlets could be considered “load terminals.”  The opinion held that the ‘340 patent, “never describes receptacle outlets as load terminals,” and that, “the circuit diagram drawings in the ’340 patent all clearly label the load terminals separately from the receptacle outlets.”  Additionally, the opinion stated, “experts here never suggested that receptacle outlets, which they also called ‘user load terminals’ or ‘user accessible load terminals,’ could be referred to as simply load terminals.”  Instead, “they were fastidious in referring to them as separate elements.”  For this reason, the Federal Circuit held that Trimone’s 2006 GFCIs and ELE’s 2006 GFCIs do not infringe the asserted claims of the ’340 patent.

The ‘398 Patent

According to the opinion, the ’398 patent discloses a new mechanical architecture for a GFCI receptacle, describing an improved contact system that can move between a circuit-making position and a circuit-breaking position.  The ‘398 patent uses means-plus-function language to define several elements, including the limitation in dispute, which calls for a “latching means releasably retaining said conducting member.”   The ITC held that the latching means of the ‘398 patent, described a mechanical structure, which included a pin passing through a hole in a block having a shoulder that cooperates with a hole in a latch member, and a spring biasing the pin to retain the conducting member.  The Federal Circuit held that the ITC erred in determining that this mechanical arrangement was structurally equivalent to a magnetic latching system.  It relied on Toro Co. v. Deere & Co., 355 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2004), which held that “one system that accomplishes a function mechanically and another system that accomplishes the same function using magnetic force ‘function in fundamentally different ways.’”

* * * * * *

For all of the above reasons, the Federal Circuit reversed the ITC’s findings that GPG’s 2003 GFCIs infringe claims 14 and 18 of the ’340 patent; that GPG’s 2006 GFCIs infringe claims 1 and 7 of the ’398 patent and claims 14 and 18 of the ’340 patent; that Trimone’s 2006 GFCIs infringe claims 14 and 18 of the ’340 patent; and that ELE’s 2006 GFCIs infringe claims 14, 18, and 30 of the ’340 patent.  The Federal Circuit additionally remanded to the Commission to modify its limited exclusion order.

Judge Newman filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that substantial evidence supported the ITC’s determination that Appellants’ devices contained a “detection circuit” as per the ‘340 patent.  Similarly, Judge Newman found substantial evidence supporting the position that receptacle outlets should be considered “load terminals.”  She further found that a magnetic latch was known to be interchangeable with a mechanical latch and that her colleagues incorrectly overstated Toro as holding that there can never be equivalence between a mechanical latch and a magnetic latch.

Federal Circuit Affirms In Pass & Seymour Appeal (2009-1338, -1369)

On August 27, 2010, the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Pass & Seymour, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 2009-1338, -1369.  This was an appeal by Pass & Seymour, Inc. (“P&S”) from the Commission’s final determination in Certain Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters and Products Containing Same (Inv. No. 337-TA-615) that General Protecht Group, Inc., Wenzhou Trimone Science and Technology Electric Co., Ltd., and Shanghai ELE Manufacturing Corp. (collectively, the “Respondents”) do not infringe the asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,594,398 (the ‘398 patent) and 7,212,386 (the ‘386 patent) and therefore have not violated Section 337.  See our June 4, 2010 post for more details.

In the opinion, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Commission’s claim construction and infringement analyses and affirmed the determination of no violation of Section 337.

The asserted patents and accused products at issue relate to circuit interrupters for use with household electrical appliances.  In particular, the ‘398 patent is directed to improved ground fault circuit interrupters and the ‘386 patent is directed to a device that protects users and appliances from damage caused by miswiring.

Two critical claim terms were at issue in the ‘398 patent: (1) the requirement that “both” contacts be in a spaced, circuit-breaking second position, and (2) the requirement that the electrically conducting member be “unitary” and “carry” the pair of spaced contacts.  The Commission had found that the plain language of the claim required a construction of “both” that was not satisfied by the movement of only one contact.  The Commission had also found that the specification required construing “unitary” to mean that the member was a single, continuous piece and that both contacts are disposed on the same member.  Based on this claim construction, the Commission had found no infringement of the ‘398 patent by the Respondents’ accused products.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit stated that it agreed with the Commission’s claim construction and infringement analyses, and affirmed.

In the ‘386 patent, the dispute was over the claim limitation of a “circuit interrupter coupled to the actuator assembly, the circuit interrupter being configured to disconnect the first conductive path from the second conductive path in response to the actuator signal in the reset state.”  Based on the plain language of the claim and the intrinsic evidence, the Commission had found that the circuit interrupter had to be configured to trip in response to the actuator signal in the reset state.  The Federal Circuit agreed with this construction and dismissed P&S’s arguments to the contrary.  The court then affirmed the Commission’s findings of non-infringement of the ‘386 patent by Respondents’ accused products.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed all of the Commission’s claim construction and infringement findings, as well as the Commission’s final determination of no violation of Section 337.

Chimei Innolux Files New 337 Complaint Regarding Certain Liquid Crystal Display Devices

On August 23, 2010, Chimei Innolux Corporation of Taiwan, Chi Mei Optoelectronics U.S.A., Inc. of San Jose, California, and Innolux Corporation of Austin, Texas (collectively, “CMI”) filed a complaint requesting that the ITC commence an investigation pursuant to Section 337.

The complaint alleges that Sony Corporation of Japan, Sony Corporation of America of New York, New York, Sony Electronics Corporation of San Diego, California, and Sony Computer Entertainment America, LLC of Foster City, California (collectively, “Respondents” or “Sony”) through the manufacture, sale for importation, importation, and/or sale within the U.S. after importation of liquid crystal display devices and products interoperable with same infringe certain claims in U.S. Patent Nos. 6,134,092 (‘092 patent), 6,671,019 (‘019 patent), and 5,732,241 (‘241 patent) (collectively, the “Asserted Patents”).

The complaint more specifically asserts that the Sony products at issue are LCD televisions, computer monitors and notebooks, digital cameras, and video gaming consoles.

The complaint asserts that the ‘092 patent is directed to an illumination display device using point light sources, such as LED chips to emit light that travels through a waveguide and illuminates an LCD screen, wherein diffusive reflective surfaces reflect light emitted by the LED chips into areas of the waveguide between the light sources to create a substantially uniform illumination.  The complaint describes the ‘019 patent as directed generally to liquid crystals in LCD displays using a pixel electrode pattern that includes at least one non-conductive gap, the size and location of which allows for improved control of the liquid crystal orientation, resulting in faster switching speeds and a higher quality display.  The ‘241 Patent is described as a novel cache memory system architecture that decouples the computer’s main system memory from the computer host’s data bus, using a set of registers or buffers as temporary storage locations between the cache memory and the host bus, and between the cache memory and the system bus, which allows the CPU or host to access the cache while system memory transfer operations are being performed in parallel, and also hides lengthy main memory operations from the host.

Regarding related litigation, CMI identifies two separate U.S. district court cases that involved two of the Asserted Patents.  CMI added that concurrently with its complaint, it filed an action against Sony in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware for infringement of the Asserted Patents.

With respect to the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement, CMI asserts that several of its LCD television and computer monitor product lines practice one or more claims of the ‘019 and ‘092 patents, while products manufactured by a third party licensee of the ‘241 patent practices at least one of more claims of the asserted patents.   As to the economic prong, CMI asserts it has made significant investment in plant and equipment in the United States, and it made substantial investment in the exploitation of the ‘019 and ‘092 patents by engineering and research and development in the United States, while a third party licensee made substantial investments in labor and capital in activities related to the ‘241 patent.

With respect to potential remedy, Lexmark requests the ITC to issue a permanent exclusion order pursuant to Section 337(d), and a permanent cease-and-desist order pursuant to Section 337(f) directed to each Respondent.

ALJ Charneski Issues Public Version Of Initial Determination In Certain Machine Vision Software (337-TA-680)

On August 13, 2010, ALJ Carl C. Charneski issued the public version (dated July 16, 2010) of the Initial Determination (“ID”) in Certain Machine Vision Software, Machine Vision Systems, and Products Containing the Same (337-TA-680).

By way of background, the Complainants in this matter are Cognex Corporation and Cognex Technology & Investment Corporation (“Cognex”).  The patents-in-suit are U.S. Patent No. 7,016,539 (the ‘539 patent) and 7,065,262 (the ‘262 patent).  A number of respondents were terminated from the investigation and the remaining respondents are MVTec Software GmbH and MVTec LLC, Omron Corporation, Resolution Technology, Inc., Visics Corp., Daiichi Jitsugyo Viswill Co., Ltd., and Daiichi Jitsugyo (America), Inc. (collectively, the “Respondents”).

In the ID, ALJ Charneski held that none of the claims were infringed, the claims of the ‘262 patent were anticipated by the prior art, and that both patents-at-issue were invalid for failure to claim patent-eligible subject matter.

The patents-in-suit relate to machine vision, which allows machines to analyze images and take action without human intervention.

ALJ Charneski construed ten terms for the ‘539 patent and seven terms for the ‘262 patent.  In most instances, ALJ Charneski either adopted respondents’ proposed construction or a variation of their proposed construction.  ALJ Charneski found that Cognex only proved that the accused software practice three of the seventeen total claim elements.

Turning next to the invalidity allegations, ALJ Charneski held that the majority of respondents’ anticipation and obviousness defenses were insufficient and, in some cases, were not specific as to whether they believed a reference anticipated or rendered claims obvious.  The exception was the Wells reference which was held to anticipate all asserted claims of the ‘262 patent.

In addition, the on-sale and best mode challenges were rejected.  Respondents’ final invalidity argument was that both patents were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for failure to claim a patent-eligible subject matter.  The parties were ordered by ALJ Charneski to provide supplemental briefing on this issue in light of Bilski v. Kappos.  ALJ Charneski determined that both patents simply claimed “algorithms that perform calculations on digital images without effecting any real-world result” and were, therefore, nothing more than “abstract ideas”.